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International Human Rights Claims After
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic: Swan
Song for the Legal Lohengrin?
By LESLIE RAISSMAN WELLBAUM
Member of the Class of 1986

It is one thing for a student note-writer to urge that courts accept the
challengesinvolved. . . [but c]ourtsought not to serve as debatingclubs
forprofessors willing to argue over what is or is not an accepted violation
of the law of nations.
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 824, 827 (D.C. Cir.

1984) (Robb, J.).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Judiciary Act of 1789 contained a terse and cryptic grant to

federal district courts of "cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the
several States, . . of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 1 The
purpose and legislative history of this statute are shrouded in mysteryone jurist has called it "a kind of legal Lohengrin," for "no one seems to
know whence it came." 2 It is usually viewed, however, as "reflecting a
concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with foreign nations and
indicating a desire to give matters of international significance to the jurisdiction of federal institutions."3
In the two centuries since its promulgation, the Alien Tort Claims
1. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). Usually referred to as the
Alien Tort Claims Act or the Alien Tort Statute, it is currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1982) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.").
2. IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.). See generally
Note, A Legal Lohengrin: FederalJurisdiction Under The Alien Torts Claim Act of 1789, 14
U.S.F.L. Rav. 105 (1979).
3. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964). See generally
Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Partof the NationalLaw of the United States, (Part I), 101
U. PA. L. REv. 26 (1952); THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton).
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Act has been successfully invoked in only three cases: Bolchos v. Darrell4 in 1795, and in this century Adra v. Clift5 and Filartigav. PenaIrala.6 In these, and in the more numerous cases in which jurisdiction
has been denied 7 the central issue has generally been whether a given
8
tortious act constitutes a violation of the "law of nations.",
Thus, in Filartigav. Pena-Irala,Judge Kaufman of the Second Circuit found section 1350 jurisdiction in an action by a Paraguayan physician against a former Paraguayan police official for the wrongful death of
his teenage son, based on a finding that the torture inflicted on Joelito
Filartiga-allegedly because of his father's anti-government activitiesconstituted a violation of the law of nations.9 In so finding, the court
overruled its own prior dictum that "violations of international law do
not occur when the aggrieved parties are nationals of the acting state,"'
a notion which it called "clearly out of tune with the current usage and
practice of international law."'" Moreover, the content of this current
usage and practice, according to Judge Kaufman, may be ascertained,
inter alia, by reference to nonbinding multilateral treaties, declarations,
conventions, protocols and the like. 2 The Filartigadecision was hailed
4. 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) (invoking the Act as an alternative to maritime jurisdiction).
5. 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) (involving a passport violation in furtherance of
wrongful denial of child custody).
6. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). (Although some commentators use a tilde-Pefia-this
Note will employ the Second Circuit's spelling-Pena-when referring to the Filartigadefendant.) A possible application is also considered in 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250 (1907) (Mexican
citizens harmed by the action of an American irrigation company along the Rio Grande).
Most recently, § 1350 jurisdiction was summarily granted to alien plaintiffs alleging governmental torture and expropriation in de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT
(MCX) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. file).
7. Collected in Annot., 34 A.L.R. FED. 388 (1977).
8. The term "law of nations" is used interchangeably with the more prosaic "international law" (i.e., customary international law). The Alien Tort Claims Act also deals with
treaty violations (conventional or positive international law). That aspect of the Act, however,
is beyond the scope of this Note.
9. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878, 884-85.
10. Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 1976).
11. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884. Implicit in this self-reversal is a rejection as well of the
positivist assumption underlying the Dreyfus, dictum, i.e., that the law of nations "deals primarily with the relationship among nations rather than among individuals," 534 F.2d at 30-3 1,
or at least that it does not "vest a plaintiff with individual legal rights." Id. at 31. For an
overview of the evolution of the role of the individual in international law, see Note, The Law
of Nations in the District Courts: FederalJurisdiction Over Tort Claims by Aliens Under 28
U.Sc. § 1350, 1 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 71 (1977).

12. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880-85 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153,
160-61 (1820)) ("What the law of nations. . . is, 'may be ascertained by consulting the works
of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or
by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.' "). See also The Paquete Habana,
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as a landmark by the international human fights community and inspired a flurry of commentary, 3 much of it attempting to predict which
acts would be held to violate the law of nations under the Filartiga
14
analysis.
Exactly a year after the Second Circuit's decision in Filartiga,the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia decided Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 5 a suit arising out of an alleged
PLO attack on a tourist bus in Israel. 6 The plaintiffs asserted jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act, but the court never reached the
threshold question, whether terrorism constitutes "a tort in violation of
the law of nations."' 7 Instead, the complaint was dismissed because
plaintiffs failed to plead a private fight of action granted by international

law.'

8

Early in 1984, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal in a short
per curiam opinion.' 9 Each of the three judges, however, submitted a
long and contentious concurrence which, in the words of Judge Bork,
"can only add to the confusion surrounding this subject."20 Judge Ed175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945).
13. See, e.g., Blum & Steinhardt, FederalJurisdiction Over InternationalHuman Rights
Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 53
(1981); Note, The Alien Tort Statute: InternationalLaw as the Rule of Decision, 49 FORDHAM
L. REv. 874 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Alien Tort Statute];Comment, Torture as a
Tort in Violation ofInternationalLaw: Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 33 STAN. L. REv. 353 (1981);
Note, The Domestic Application of InternationalHuman Rights Law: Evolving the Species, 5
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 161, 177 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Evolving the
Species]; FederalJurisdiction,Human Rights and the Law of Nations: Essays on Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 305 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Symposium].
14. See, e.g., Note, Torture as a Violation of the Law of Nations: An Analysis of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350-Filartigav. Pena-Irala, 16 TEx. INT'L L.J. 117, 118, 133-34 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Torture as a Violation of the Law of Nations];Note, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: A New
Forumfor ViolationsofInternationalHuman Rights, 30 AM. U.L. REv. 807, 831 n.178 (1981);
Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 87-97.
15. 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981), aft'd sub nom. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
726 F.2d 774 (1984). The opinion is reported as Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic in
the district court and as Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic in the circuit court. To the extent
possible, this Note will respect each court's usage. When the opinions are referred to jointly,
they will be referred to as the "Tel-Oren opinions".
16. For details of the incident see N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1978, section 1 at 1, col.8; N.Y.
Times, Mar. 13, 1978, at A14, col.1; E. MICKOLuS, TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM, 1968-1979,
at 777-79 (1980).
17. Hanoch Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 545. For a discussion of this issue see Note, Terrorism as a Tort in Violation of the Law of Nations, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 236 (1982).
18. Hanoch Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 550. For a criticism of Judge Green's approach see
Note, Hanoch Tel-Oren: The Retreat From Filartiga, 4 CARDOZO L. REv. 665 (1983).
19. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
20. Id. at 823.
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wards-on this, if on nothing else-agreed: "This case deals with an
area of the law that cries out for clarification by the Supreme Court."2 1
On June 14, 1984, Hanoch Tel-Oren fied for a writ of certiorari.2 2
This Note considers the way in which the Supreme Court, in construing the Alien Tort Claims Act, might resolve the conflicts between
the Second and District of Columbia Circuits, and the effect of a high
court resolution on international human rights litigation in federal
courts. Part II summarizes the four Tel-Oren opinions in an attempt to
identify the major issues raised and the underlying concerns they reflect.
Part III looks at the questions presented in the petition for certiorari,
with emphasis on conceptualizing a cause of action under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, and on the applicability of the political question doctrine.
In conclusion this Note discusses the ramifications of Supreme
Court adjudication of these issues, which will ultimately determine
whether Filartigastands as a monumental precedent which opens the
doors of the United States federal courts to aggrieved aliens stripped of
an international human right, or whether it is destined to be regarded
as an aberrational decision, the
path of justice that its open door ex23
poses never to be tread [sic].

II.
A.

THE TEL-OREN OPINIONS

The District Court: Judge Green's Opinion2 4

Three aspects of Judge Green's opinion are remarkable: 1) Despite
the existence of several narrower grounds on which the case might easily
have been dismissed, she chose to discourse at some length on the meaning and scope of the Alien Tort Claims Act;25 2) Her discussion relied
21. Id. at 775. But see Judge Robb's concurrence: "I must disagree. When a case
presents broad and novel questions of this sort, courts ought not to appeal for guidance to the
Supreme Court, but should instead look to Congress and the President." Id. at 827.
22. 52 U.S.LW. 3922 (U.S. Jun. 26, 1984) (No. 83-2052), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354
(1985).
23. Note, Torture as a Violation of the Law of Nations, supra note 14, at 138. For a
discussion of Filartiga'sinherently limited scope see Hassan, A Conflict of Philosophies: The
Filartiga Jurisprudence,32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 250 (1983); Rusk, A Comment on Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, Symposium, supra note 13, at 311 (relegating the "landmark" decision to a future
"But see. . ." footnote).
24. Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981).
25. Id. at 548-50. See Schneebaum, InternationalLaw as GuarantorofJudicially-Enforceable Rights: A Reply to Professor Oliver, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 65, 72 (1981) (stating that any of
these "fatal infirmities" is sufficient ratio decidendi, and thus Judge Green's views on § 1350
are merely dicta). Plaintiffs appealed Judge Green's rulings on the statute of limitations and
the two jurisdictional claims (§§ 1331 and 1350), Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775, but the appellate
debate centers on the construction of § 1350.

1985]

International Human Rights

more upon the opinion of a Stanford University law student than on that
2 6 3) Although she adopted the stuof the Second Circuit in Filartiga;
dent's criticism of Judge Kaufman's analysis, she ignored his justification
of the holding on "a sounder constitutional basis."2 7
Judge Green's interpretation of the Act is premised on two separate,

though related, analogies. First, the court assumes that "the jurisdictional bases of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 [the general federal question statute],
and 28 U.S.C. § 1350 are identical as to the role of the law of nations,"2 8
because both depend on the fact that international law is part of the federal common law.29 Second, the court states that "[t]he requirement that

international law provide a private right of action produces no less compelling reason as concerns the law of nations than it does when treaties
31
are involved," 30 implying that neither law is self-executing.
Judge Green concludes that for a claim alleging a violation of cus-

tomary international law to be heard in federal court, "[s]omewhere in
the law of nations . . . the plaintiffs must discern and plead a cause of
action that, if proved, would permit the Court to grant relief."'32 She also
agrees with the Stanford commentator that "to interpret international
human rights law to create a federal private right of action overstates the
level of agreement among nations on remedies for human rights
violations.

33

The opinion contains only passing reference to Filartigaand does
26. Hanoch Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 549 (citing Comment, supra note 13, at 357).
27. Comment, supra note 13 at 357-63. See infra text accompanying notes 158-60.
28. Hanoch Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 549 n.2.
29. See The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) ("[T"he court is bound by the
law of nations, which is a part of the law of the land."); see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677, 700 (1900). See generally Dickinson, supra note 3.
30. Hanoch Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 548.
31. The self-executing treaty doctrine is said to have originated with the words of Chief
Justice Marshall:
Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be
regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an Act of the legislature, whenever it
operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of
the stipulation import a contract-when either of the parties engages to perform a
particular act-the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department;
and the Legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the
court.

Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). Accord Head Money Cases, 112
U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884); Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal.2d 718, 721-22 (1952); United States v.
Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 875-77 (5th Cir. 1979). See generally Note, Evolving the Species, supra
note 13, at 190-207.
32. Hanoch Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 549.
33. Id. (quoting Comment, supra note 13, at 357).

Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review

[Vol. 9

not indicate why its "mandate" 3 4 should not apply in this case. By
reaching an issue unnecessary to the disposition of the case,3 5 and then
rejecting both the recent, highly-publicized judicial precedent and the alternative suggested by the very commentator whose criticism it adopted,
the district court "really seems to have clothed its underlying abstentionist or non-interventionist attitude in jurisdictional attire."3 6 This attitude
appears undisguised, however, in the court's warning against "judicial
interference with foreign affairs and international relations, traditionally
an area where courts have chosen to stay their hands," 37 and is nakedly
stated in its justification of dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than merely for failure to state a claim: "Otherwise, federal
courts would clutch power over cases, under the guise of the law of nations, undoubtedly casting effect on international relations and foreign
38
policy."
B.

The Court of Appeals: The Opinions of Judges Edwards, Bork,
and Robb

39

1. Judge Edwards' Opinion
Unlike Judge Green, Judge Edwards adheres to the legal principles
established in Filartiga,4° but finds it factually distinguishable from TelOren.
Specifically, I do not believe the law of nations imposes the same responsibility or liability on non-state actors, such as the PLO, as it does
on states and persons acting under color of state law. Absent direction
from the Supreme Court on the proper scope of the obscure section
1350, I am therefore not prepared to extend Filartiga'sconstruction of
section 1350 to encompass this case.41
Judge Edwards' analysis begins with the assumption, which he attributes to the Second Circuit as well, that section 1350 itself is the
34. Hanoch Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 548. For a Filartigaanalysis of the Tel-Oren facts,

see Case Comment, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic: Redefining the Alien Tort ClaimsAct,
70 MINN. L. REv. 211 (1985).
35. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
36. Note, supra note 18, at 678.
37. Hanoch Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 548.
38. Id. at 550. Judge Green's position is championed on appeal by Judge Bork, see infra

text following note 77.
39. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). This Note, like the
appellate opinions themselves, focuses on the construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1350, the Alien Tort
Claims Act, as it applies to the case of the alien plaintiffs against the PLO in Tel-Oren.
40. Id. at 777.
41. Id. at 776.
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source of a right to sue, under either of two formulations: one exemplified by Filartiga and one by Adra v. Clift. 2 He concludes that "under
neither [formulation] must plaintiffs identify and plead a right to sue
granted by the law of nations." 3 Such a requirement would, in fact,
"effectively nullify the 'law of nations' portion of section 1350."" A
treaty, on the other hand, may or may not create judicially enforceable
obligations depending on its terms,4 5 a distinction glossed over by Judge
Green 4" and explicitly rejected by Judge Bork.47
Nor does Judge Edwards share the Green-Bork notion that the role
of the law of nations in establishing jurisdiction under section 1331 and
section 1350 is identical.4 Section 1350 does not require that an action
"arise under" the law of nations (which would suggest that plaintiffs
must indeed identify a remedy granted, implicitly or explicitly, by international law) but only mandates a violation thereof in order to create a
cause of action.
Thus, Judge Edwards rejects both analogies which formed the basis
for the district court's analysis, and concludes from his study of Filartiga
that "[tlhere simply is no basis in the language of the statute, its legislative history or relevant precedent to read section 1350 as though Congress had required that a right to sue must be found in the law of
nations."'4 9
An alternative approach to section 1350, illustrated by Adra v.
5 Oinvolves a two-part jurisdictional test: Plaintiffs
Aift,
must allege both
a law of nations offense and a municipal tort, but the two requirements
need not be satisfied by the same act. Judge Edwards finds support for
such an application of the Alien Tort Claims Act in its "historical underpinnings"-the concern of eighteenth-century scholars for a single judi42. 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961). This is the only other case in which federal jurisdiction has been entirely predicated on the Alien Tort Claims Act.
43. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 788.
44. Id. at 778.
45. Id. at 778 n.2. See supra note 31.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
47. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 820.
48. Compare Judge Edwards' opinion, Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 779 nn. 3-4, with Judge
Bork's opinion, 726 F.2d at 800, and the district court's opinion, 517 F. Supp. at 549 n.2. See
also supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
49. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 779. See also 26 Op. Att'y. Gen. 250, 252-53 (1907) (section
1350's antecedent provides both a forum and a right to sue), cited in 726 F.2d at 780 (Edwards,
J.).
50. 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) (suit for unlawful withholding of child custody-a
tort under municipal law-accomplished by passport falsification in derogation of international law).

114
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cial voice in foreign affairs, for example-and in the text of the 1789
Judiciary Act itself, particularly the language and location of section
1350's original predecessor.5 One advantage of this interpretation is
that basing the complaint on domestic law relieves federal district courts
of the "awesome duty" to derive standards of liability from such an
"amorphous entity" as the law of nations. 2 But the formulation has
problems, which include questions about the severity of a law of nations
offense sufficient to trigger section 135013 and the requisite nexus between
the purely jurisdictional element and the substantive domestic tort. 4
Moreover, Judge Edwards has "misgivings" about applying section 1350
in its Adra formulation to suits between two aliens, given the statute's
intent to keep the United States out of international confrontations.5 In
light of these concerns, Judge Edwards believes that:
the Adra formulation makes sense only if construed to cover actions by
aliens for domestic torts that occur in the territory of the United States
and injure "substantial rights" under international law, or for universal crimes, as under the first [Filartiga]formulation, or for torts committed by American citizens abroad . . 56
These limits, he notes, are consistent with the parameters of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction established by international law.5 7 In sum,
although Judge Edwards finds the Adra alternative a "tenable construction" of the Alien Tort Claims Act, he is "less .comfortable" with it than
55
with the Second Circuit's formulation in Filartiga.
After stating his agreement with the Filartiga court that section
1350's "law of nations" clause must be interpreted with reference to
modern international law rather than to that of Blackstone and the
Founders,59 Judge Edwards takes issue with his colleague, Judge Bork,
over the role of the courts and the appropriate limits of judicial self51. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782-86.
52. Id. at 781, 787.
53. Id. at 787. This issue is highlighted when passport misuse is compared to official
torture or international terrorism.
54. Id. at 788. In Adra the court found a "but for" relationship sufficient. While the
plaintiff father was not directly harmed by the international law violation (passport regulation
being exclusively the concern of sovereign states), he would not have been denied custody "but
for" the passport abuse. Id.

55.
was an
56.
57.

Id. at 784 n.13, 786 n.18. In Adra the husband and co-defendant of plaintiff's ex-wife
American.
Id. at 788 (citation omitted). Query whether Adra falls within any of these categories.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (REVISED) §§ 402-

404 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981)).
58. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 777.
59. Id. at 789.
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restraint. He argues that the separation of powers concerns underlying
both the act of state and political question doctrines do not justify abstention in the present case, but rather impose an affirmative duty on courts
to exercise the jurisdiction-however ill-advised or difficult to implement-granted by the first Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1350. He suggests
that Judge Bork "would keep these cases out of court under any circumstance," 60 either by reading a right-to-sue requirement into the Act or by
extending and distorting the concept of nonjusticiability. "Vigorously
waving in one hand a separation of powers banner, ironically, with the
other [Judge Bork] rewrites Congress' words and renounces the task that
Congress has placed before him."" Particularly troublesome to Judge
Edwards is the fact that state courts, which are inappropriate forums for
the resolution of issues implicating foreign affairs, are available to many
unsuccessful section 1350 plaintiffs. Federal abstention in these cases
would lead to precisely the situation that section 1350 apparently was
designed to avoid. 2
The basis of Judge Edwards' concurrence in the dismissal of TelOren and the crux of his unwillingness to apply Filartiga,despite his explicit endorsement of its legal principles, is the question of the liability of
non-state actors under the law of nations. The defendant in Filartiga
acted "under color of law"; the court found official torture to be in violation of international law. Because the PLO is not a state, either by
United States recognition or by United Nations definition,63 and its
members do not act under color of any state's law, Edwards is not prepared to extend law of nations liability to the PLO, absent international
consensus or direction from the Supreme Court."
Before reaching this conclusion Judge Edwards surveys the evolution of the individual's role in international law65 from the eighteenthcentury naturalists to the ninetheenth-century positivists. He notes a
movement since 1945 away from "statism" back toward a recognition of
individual rights and duties under international law, especially among
60. Id. at 790. See also id. at 789-91. For extensive discussion of act of state and political
question doctrines, see infra text accompanying notes 184-262.
61. Id. at 790.
62. Id. at 790-91.
63. "To qualify as a state under international law, there must be a people, a territory, a
government and a capacity to enter into relations with other states." Id. at 791 n.21 (citation
omitted). See also id. at 804 n.9 (Bork, J.).
64. Id. at 792.
65. Id. at 794, 792 n.22. See generallyNote, supra note 11; Dickinson, supra note 3, at 2630; Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Partof the NationalLaw of the United States, (Part II),
101 U. PA. L. REv. 792, 792-95 (1953).
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the commentators, but finds their discussions "more prescriptive than
descriptive; they recognize shifts in firmly entrenched doctrine but are
unable to define a clear new consensus." 66Judge Edwards examines a
number of cases "in the truly private arena" such as Adra v. Clift,67 but
finds they only illustrate the occasional anomalous imposition of individual responsibility under international law. 68 Furthermore, based on definitions in international documents, he finds that torture, unlike piracy, is
not an exception to the general statist rule. 69 Therefore,
[w]hile I have little doubt that the trend in international law is toward
a more expansive allocation of rights and obligations to entities other
than states, I decline to read section 1350 to cover torture by non-state
actors, absent guidance from the
Supreme Court on the statute's usage
7
of the term "law of nations.", 0
Finally, beyond the non-state actor hurdle lies another, the status of
"terrorism" in international law. Given the division of world opinion as
shown, for example, by the conflicting language of United Nations documents, Judge Edwards does not believe that under current law terrorist
attacks, however repugnant, amount to a law of nations violation.7 1
Having structured his concurrence largely in opposition to the views
of Judge Bork, Judge Edwards concludes by attacking the position of
Senior Circuit Judge Robb: "A judge should not retreat under facile labels of abstention or nonjusticiability, such as the 'political question doctrine,' merely because a statute is ambiguous." 7 2 Based on the general
test outlined in Baker v. Carr,73 and on its specific application to questions implicating foreign relations in Goldwater v. Carter,7 4 Judge Edwards believes that the political question doctrine's narrow formulations
66. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 794.
67. 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 50-58.
68. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 793. By contrast, individual responsibility for actions under
color of state law appears to have been a recognized exception at least since the Nuremberg
Trials. Cf Judicial Decisions, International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment &
Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 220-21 (1947) ("[Crimes against international law are
committed by men, not by abstract entities .... ").
69. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 794-95. Contra Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890. Hostis humani
generis,an enemy of all mankind, the pirate was traditionally liable to capture and trial wherever he was found. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 60-62. See generally Dickinson, Is
the Crime of Piracy Obsolete? 38 HARV. L. REV. 334 (1925).
70. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 795.
71. Id. at 795-96. But see U.N. Resolution: Anti-Terrorist Vote Is Now Unanimous, San
Francisco Chron., Dec. 10, 1985, at 16, col. 1.
72. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 796. For a discussion of the political question doctrine in this
case, see infra text accompanying notes 208-62.
73. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). For an outline of the test, see infra text accompanying note 214.
74. 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (discussed infra in text accompanying notes 241-46).
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exclude this case, because none of the categories identified in Baker is
present, nor does the action implicate those separation of powers principles which are its central concern. 75 To the extent that Judge Robb's
concern is with international comity, "the Supreme Court-in the Act of
State Doctrine-and Congress-in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act-have each delimited the scope of necessary judicial restraint
.. . .76 In any event, Judge Edwards concludes that "to expand the
the
[political question] doctrine at this juncture would be to counter
77
direction.
opposite
the
in
scholars
and
courts
of
movement
2. Judge Bork's Opinion
While Judge Edwards' concurrence with the district court's dismissal of Hanoch Tel-Oren's claim against the PLO for lack of section 1350
subject matter jurisdiction rests primarily on his perception that a nonstate defendant is not liable for a violation of international law, Judge
Bork focuses on whether, under the same norms, an individual plaintiff
has a cause of action. He concludes that neither the law of nations nor
any treaty explicitly provides appellants a cause of action and that none
should be inferred, chiefly because of separation of powers principles
"which caution courts to avoid potential
interference with the political
78
branches' conduct of foreign relations.
Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized implied
causes of action to enforce federally protected rights-both constitutional 79 and statutory°---Judge Bork distinguishes the instant case "for
here there appear to be 'special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.' " These factors are constitu75. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 797. See infra text accompanying notes 231-62.
76. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 797 n.30.
77. Id. at 798.
78. Id. at 799. For a rigorous and detailed critique of Bork's analysis, see D'Amato,
Judge Bork's Concept of the Law of Nations is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92
(1985).
79. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (ruling that a private remedy
exists for fourth amendment violations); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (ruling that a
private remedy exists for fifth amendment violations).
80. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Court held there is no private remedy under
the Federal Elections Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1976) but it enunciated a four-factor test for "determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not
explicitly providing one." 422 U.S. at 78.
81. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801, quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. It is arguable, however,
that Congress has affirmatively stated its "intent to give effect to international law . . . by
passing a jurisdictional statute," Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1427-28 (C.D. Cal.
1985), namely the Alien Tort Claims Act. Judge Bork's reliance on Montana-Dakota Utilities
Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951) for the proposition that jurisdic-
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tional and derive, in Judge Bork's view, from separation of powers
principles. He notes that traditionally foreign affairs have been the exclusive province of the political branches 2 and that the judiciary has limited
its own power in the area of international law by the act of state and
political question doctrines. Whether or not either doctrine is applicable
to the facts of this case, "the concerns that underlie them are present and
demand recognition here." 8 3
In reviewing the act of state doctrine, Judge Bork stresses the shift
in focus in Sabbatino 4 and its progeny from the relationship among sovereign states (comity) to the relationship among the branches of the federal government (separation of powers). He identifies two distinct
aspects of the separation of powers that play a decisive role in the application of the act of state doctrine: (1) "the potential for interference
with the political branches' functions," and (2) "the fitness of an issue
for judicial resolution."8 5
Both elements are also reflected in the political question doctrine
and indeed, as Judge Bork points out, the two are sometimes said to be
identical or, at least, merging.8 6 Quoting the Baker v. Carr test 7 and
noting its frequent application to questions touching on foreign relations,
he admits, "[i]f it were necessary, I might well hold that the political
question doctrine bars this lawsuit . . . . Such a determination is not
tional statutes do not create causes of action, 726 F.2d at 811, is undercut by the Court's
contrary holding in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)
discussed infra in text accompanying notes 152-65.
See generally Comment, After Tel-Oren: Should FederalCourts Infer a Cause of Action
Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 3 DICK. J. INT'L L. 281 (1985).
82. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801 (quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302
(1918)). See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)
(referring to "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ
of the federal government in the field of international relations"); Gordon, American Courts,
InternationalLaw and PoliticalQuestions Which Touch Foreign Relations, 14 INT'L LAw. 297,
298 (1980) ("American courts have tended to locate [the federal government's foreign relations] power exclusively in the executive, except where the Constitution expressly confers it
upon Congress.").
83. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801-02.
84. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
85. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 802-03.
86. Id. at 802 n.7, 804. The relationship between the two doctrines is illustrated by their
application to the facts of Tel-Oren. Since the PLO is not a state (see supra note 63), the act of
state doctrine would seem inapplicable. The more separation of powers concerns replace comity as the underlying rationale, however, the less important becomes the defendant's status in
the community of nations, compared to the nature of the claim itself (that is, whether the
issues of fact and law raise problems of judicial interference or competence), and the closer the
act of state approaches the political question doctrine.
87. 369 U.S. at 217. See infra text accompanying note 214.
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necessary, however, because many of the same considerations that govern application of the political question doctrine also govern the appropriateness of providing appellants with a cause of action. 8 8
Among these considerations are: (1) the difficulty of determining
whether international law has been violated; (2) the significant role in
American foreign policy played by the Middle East in general and the
PLO in particular; and (3) the nature of appellants' international law
claim involving a putatively non-state defendant, an inquiry into the
PLO's immediate purposes and long-range goals, and a lack of consensus
on the role of terrorism in international law.89 Judge Bork concludes
that
there is sufficient controversy of a politically sensitive nature about the
content of any relevant international principles that litigation of appellants' claims would present, in acute form, many of the problems that
the separation of powers principles inherent in the act of state and
political question doctrines caution courts to avoid.9"
Refusing to infer, under these circumstances, any cause of action not
expressly granted, Judge Bork proceeds to the next step in his analysis: a
survey of the possible sources of an explicit private right to sue. Predictably, he does not find any, either in federal law (common or statutory) or
in international law (customary or conventional). Of thirteen treaties
cited by appellants, only five are in force or binding upon the United
States, and none of these even impliedly provides a private right of action
absent implementing legislation.9" As for federal common law, Judge
Bork dismisses the contention that it automatically provides a cause of
action merely by incorporating the law of nations. Rather, federal common law is a nonstatutory, nonconstitutional rule of decision from which
it would be inadvisable, for separation of powers reasons, to imply a
cause of action.9 2
On the other hand, Judge Bork also rejects the district court's implication that federal law could never provide a cause of action not found in
international law. In Judge Bork's view, Congress has the power to provide individuals a statutory right to seek damages for violations not
88. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 803. In a footnote, Judge Bork explains his reluctance to rely
on a doctrine whose contours are "murky and unsettled," as indicated by a lack of consensus
about its meaning among both jurists and scholars. Id. n.8.
89. Id. at 804-08.
90. Id. at 808.
91. Id. at 808-10. See supra note 31.
92. Id. at 810-11.
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otherwise actionable under international law; 93 it simply has not done so,
certainly not in the Alien Tort Claims Act.
Judge Bork characterizes "[t]he broadest reading of section 1350 as
evidence of congressional recognition [as opposed to creation] of such a
cause of action" as merely requiring an international violation as a jurisdictional prerequisite, coupled with a cause of action for damages sounding in traditional tort.94 He rejects this construction of section 1350,
which he attributes to both Judge Edwards and the Filartigacourt, "unless a narrow reading of the provision is incompatible with congressional
intent."9 5
From the scant available evidence of legislative intent, Bork infers
that the federal courts were opened to aliens in order to avoid international conflict. 96 He points out that only recently has section 1350 jurisdiction been sought in connection with human rights claims. 97

He

believes that "in 1789 there was no concept of international human
rights; neither was there, under the traditional version of customary international law, any recognition of a right of private parties to
recover."98
The Supreme Court has traditionally been reluctant to expand federal jurisdiction by broad statutory construction. 99 What then may section 1350 have been enacted to accomplish-what kinds of alien tort
actions were meant by the first Congress to be brought in the federal
courts? Judge Bork finds his answer in Blackstone: violation of safeconducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy."o But,
93. Id. at 810 n.18.
94. Id. at 811. This construction fits theAdra facts, but query whether Filartigacan be so
described.

95. Id. at 812.
96. Id. Judge Bork believes, however, that the adjudication in federal courts of disputes
over international violence occurring abroad is "far more likely to exacerbate tensions with
other nations than to promote peaceful relations." Id. at 816.
97. Id. at 812-13. Because there have been only three successful-and factually quite
disparate-invocations of the Act, id. at 813 n.21, query whether the sample is large enough to
refer, by way of contrast, to "cases like this one or like Filartiga." Id. at 812-13.
98. Id. at 813. It is beyond the scope of this Note to take issue in detail with these asser-

tions, except to repeat the oft-noted "basic similarity between contemporary human rights law
and provisions of the law of nations in 1789." Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 58. One
wonders where in history Judge Bork would locate Jefferson's "inalienable rights" and les
droits de l'homme at the heart of the French Revolution. For a discussion of traditional (prestatist) natural law as the framers knew it, including the role of the individual as subject, see
Note, supra note 11; Dickinson, supra note 3.

99. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 813.
100. Id. at 813-15 (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 68, 72 (Sharswood ed.
1865)).
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he adds, "[t]hese thoughts as to the possible original intention underlying
section 1350 are admittedly speculative."10 1 This somewhat disjunctive
series of questionable propositions leads Judge Bork to the unexceptionable if inconclusive position that "[a] statute whose original meaning is
hidden from us and yet which, if its works are read incautiously with
modem assumptions in mind, is capable of plunging our nation into foreign conflicts, ought to be approached by the judiciary with great
circumspection." 10 2
Yet even the most circumspect jurist, even the narrowest reading of
the Alien Tort Statute, might permit jurisdiction (subject, always, to considerations of "justiciability") if modem international law expressly
granted a cause of action. In the last part of the second step in Judge
Bork's analysis, he asks whether an individual right to sue may be found
in current customary international law and answers in the negative. He
notes in passing that in international relations, law itself plays a lesser
role than diplomacy and other "political tools," and that much of socalled international "law" is merely aspirational. Both of these characteristics distinguish it from municipal law and militate against judicial
3
10
enforcement of its norms.

Judge Bork's rejection of the Second Circuit's analysis rests primarily on its failure to address the issue of the existence of a cause of action
independent of the jurisdictional statute. But he also distinguishes Filartiga from the case at bar on three counts: (1) Its defendant-PenaIrala-was a state official, subject to international duties (Judge Edwards' central concern); (2) his acts violated the written law of, and were
unratified by, his own government-Paraguay-which is, in any event, of
marginal importance to United States foreign policy; (3) the proscription
of official torture, unlike terrorism, is neither disputed nor politically
sensitive.1 4
In summary, Judge Bork notes that "Judge Edwards' interpretation
would require us to hear this case,"105 while he (Bork) believes it would
violate the spirit if not the letter of constitutionally mandated separation
of powers to do so. "That," he says, "is the fundamental reason I have
argued that it is improper for judges to infer a private cause of action not
101. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 815. For a less kind evaluation of these thoughts, see Judge

Edwards' concurring opinion, id. at 778-79.
102. Id. at 812.
103. Id. at 816-19.
104. Id. at 819-20.
105. Id. at 821.
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explicitly granted." 106 Moreover, should such an express private right of
action ever come into being, Judge Bork stands ready, albeit more reluctantly than Judge Robb, to invoke "the constitutional core" of the political question doctrine to bar "this or any similar action."'0 7
3.

Judge Robb's Opinion

The senior circuit judge shares Judge Bork's concern with separation of powers but not his disinclination to preclude jurisdiction by invoking a traditional abstention doctrine. Unlike his colleagues, Judge
Robb tenders a short and simple opinion: "It seems to me that the political question doctrine controls. This case is nonjusticiable."' 8
By way of elaboration he offers five specific objections to adjudication. The first is that this case involves standards that defy judicial application. 10 9 For example, the international status of terrorist acts and the
ultimate origin of responsibility for any given "terrorist outrage" are beyond a court's ability to determine.
Secondly, "this case involves questions that touch on sensitive matters of diplomacy that uniquely demand a singlevoiced statement of policy by the Government." 110 Judge Robb emphatically denies the PLO
any status whatever vis-A-vis the United States, while at the same time he
hints darkly at "hidden contacts" which might be disturbed by judicial
investigation.'' Thirdly, ,"questions connected to the activities of terrorists have historically been within the exclusive domain of the executive and legislative branches."" 2 This is Robb's version of the separation
of powers argument, in support of which he cites Diggs v. Richardson,"3
a "model of judicial deference"' 14 perhaps, but a case which has nothing
whatever to do with terrorism.
106. Id. at 822.

107. Id. Judge Bork prefers other grounds because Supreme Court precedent "in general
and as it bears in particular upon the constitutional component of the doctrine, is most
unclear."

108. Id. at 823.
109. Id. at 823-24.
110. Id. at 824-25. For the view that the very possibility of quiet diplomacy on the part of
the executive renders the judiciary "the least vulnerable branch" in dealing with similar
problems in a slightly different context, see Garvey, Repression of the PoliticalEmigre-The
Undergroundto InternationalLaw: A Proposalfor Remedy, 90 YALE L.J. 78, 88 (1980).

111. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823.
112. Id. at 825-26.
113. 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that private citizens lack standing to enforce a
United Nations Security Council Resolution against trading with South Africa). The case is
usually cited as an illustration of the non-self-executing treaty doctrine. See, e.g., Hanoch TelOren, 517 F. Supp. at 547.

114. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 825.
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Judge Robb's fourth objection is that "cases such as this one are not
susceptible to judicial handling."' 1 5 Under this rubric Judge Robb voices
his concern about the pragmatic problems of section 1350 adjudication,
which he compares to the difficulties encountered in applying the "political exception" doctrine in proceedings to extradite persons accused of
terrorist activities. Finally, he states that "the possible consequences 116
of
judicial action in this area are injurious to the national interest."
Among these are embarrassment to the nation, the use of trials for political propaganda, and the difficulty of finding a limiting principle once the
floodgates are open." 7
Judge Robb concludes that "courts must steer resolutely away from
involvement in this manner of case. . . . They are not used to this kind
of question."' 18 His determination to keep this and other like cases out
of the federal courts (and its source in an attitude of deference to the
executive in foreign affairs) is clear, but the details of Judge Robb's position are less so. The political question characteristics which he enumerates are reminiscent of, but never quite congruent with the more familiar
Baker119 criteria, to which, inexplicably, he never even refers.
C.

Summary

Running through all four Tel-Oren opinions are certain legitimate
concerns about the role of the United States among sovereign nations
and of the judiciary among coequal branches of a tripartite national government, about the role of the individual in contemporary international
law and of "terrorism" in world politics. But each judge's consideration
of these issues leads to a significantly different outcome as to both construction of section 1350 and disposition of this particular case.
Judge Edwards alone would grant to certain international human
rights plaintiffs a federal forum based on the Alien Tort Claims Act. But
this would involve an extremely circumscribed class of cases, bounded on
one side by the act of state doctrine (whenever the defendant is a state
agent acting in an official capacity) and on the other, by the non-liability
of a non-state actor for violations of the law of nations. It is rare indeed
that those who torture or terrorize "under color of law," that is quasi115. Id. at 826.
116. Id. at 826-27.
117. Judge Robb ignores the limitations that might be imposed in many of these cases by
the lack of personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, the act of state doctrine, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
118. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 827.
119. See infra text accompanying note 214.
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officially, are subsequently repudiated by their own government's uncharacteristic adherence to its written law. In such rare cases (which
would include Filartiga,but not Tel-Oren) Judge Edwards would grant
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
Judge Bork and Judge Robb would prefer not to hear the case at all.
Both would exercise judicial self-restraint out of deference to the presumed superior authority of the political branches in all matters touching
foreign affairs. Judge Robb would defer by way of a loose, idiosyncratic
version of the political question doctrine. Animated by the same concern
to maintain a constitutional separation of powers, Judge Bork would accomplish his objective indirectly. Assuming that no body of law, national or international, grants the alien Tel-Oren plaintiffs (or indeed, the
Filartigas) a private right to sue for tortious violations of international
law, he would simply decline to infer one like Judge Green, and dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
III. QUESTIONS PRESENTED TO THE
SUPREME COURT
The petition for certiorari in the case of Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic'2 presented the Court with four questions: (1) Whether the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals erred in holding that terrorism, torture, hostage-taking, and summary execution do not violate
the "law of nations" within the meaning of the Alien Tort Claims Act;
(2) whether the Act fails to provide a cause of action for injuries suffered
as a result of tortious actions in violation of the "law of nations," but
requires aliens to identify an explicit grant of a cause of action separate
and apart from the Act; (3) whether a suit seeking damages under sections 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1350 for injuries suffered as a result of statesponsored acts of terrorism is necessarily a non-justiciable political question; and (4) whether the Court erred in holding that United States citizens do not have a cause of action arising under "treaties of the United
States" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1331 for injuries suffered as the
result of state-sponsored acts of terrorism.'2 1
The fourth question is beyond the scope of this Note as it deals with
the claims of the non-alien plaintiffs' 2 2 under the general federal question
statute 23 based upon conventional rather than customary international
120. 53 U.S.L.W. 3101 (U.S. Aug. 14, 1984) (No. 83-2052), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354
(1985).

121. Id.
122. See Hanoch Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 548.
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
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law. Presumably, the answer would lie in the Court's application of selfexecuting treaty analysis1 24 to the facts at hand. The second and third
questions raise issues which will require adjudication no matter what
particular case or controversy eventually provides the vehicle for
Supreme Court construction of the Alien Tort Claims Act. Although
this is not true of the first question, the increasing incidence of international terrorism as a fact of life and as a topic of public concern warrants
some preliminary remarks.
A.

125
Terrorism as a Violation of the Law of Nations

The Filartigacourt held that torture, at least "official torture," is a
violation of the law of nations within the meaning of the Alien Tort
Claims Act. 126 Both hostage-taking and summary execution are among
the small number of delicts which have repeatedly been mentioned 12as7
possible areas into which the Filartigarationale might be extended.
Yet neither Tel-Oren court subjects terrorism to a detailed Filartigaanalysis to determine its international status with reference to section 1350
jurisdiction. Only Judge Edwards addresses the question directly and in
the same terms as the Second Circuit, he concludes that there is no international consensus on the meaning, let alone the condemnation, of terrorism.1 28 Moreover, even if there were international accord about the
act, Judge Edwards would not find its commission by a non-state actor to
1 29
constitute a violation of the law of nations.
Central to the courts' inquiry is a semantic problem, for the word
124. See supra note 31.
125. Query whether the first question accurately states the holding of the court of appeals.
126. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 884.
127. See, eg., Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 87-97 adding genocide, summary execution, and slavery to "the core of actionable human rights violations" after Filartiga. Hostage-taking, often a component of terrorist attacks, has been of special concern to the United
Nations. See, e.g., International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted Dec. 17,
1979, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39), U.N. Doe. A/34/819 (1979).
128. Absent consensus, there is no law of nations violation, thus no § 1350 jurisdiction.
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 795-96. But see supra note 71. While Judge Bork and Judge Robb agree
that there is controversy among nations about terrorism, they do not view this conclusion as a
failure of the law of nations prong of the § 1350 test. Rather, in their opinion, the consensus
inquiry is analytically separate from and prior to the question of statutory jurisdiction. The
confusion surrounding the issue of terrorism cuts in favor of nonjusticiability. By invoking the
political question doctrine, they never have to reach constrnction of the Alien Tort Claims
Act. Id. at 806-08 (Bork, J.) and 823-24 (Robb, J.).
129. Contra Note, supra note 17, at 241 n.32 (arguing that terrorism is a violation of customary international law and that "[i]ndividuals or groups, rather than states, are the perpetrators of terrorist acts"). Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 96, recognize that a "difficult
case is posed by acts of torture committed by terrorists at the instigation of organized political
entities which are not states." They conclude that in such cases liability is at least arguable.
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"terrorism" is really only a conclusory label, a pejorative moral judgement. "Terrorism," as one commentator put it, "is what the bad guys
do."13 Breaking the act down into its component parts, however, produces a more workable and enlightening definition:
The "tort of terrorism". . mean[s] the torts of wrongful death, battery, assault, false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional
distress which are committed in the context of a terrorist act, that is,
an act of violence with international repercussions directed against
non-combattants
[sic] or diplomats and intended to exert political
13 1
pressure.

Three elements emerge from this definition: Common law intentional torts, international repercussions, and political purpose. What
raises certain tortious conduct to the level of "terrorism," in other words,
is the international political context in which it occurs. "Terrorism"
does not exist outside this context, although the discrete acts of which it
is comprised may be perpetrated elsewhere. For example, when a band
of teenaged hoodlums "terrorize" a neighborhood, they are not called
"terrorists," nor is the term generally used in reference to the "reign of
terror" of a government in power. A terrorist attack, in common parlance, is the act of a non-state political entity, outside the context of a
conventional war. It is a surprise attack by the bad guys. This accounts
for the disharmony among nations as to whether and when terrorism
constitutes a violation of international law, for there is "a basic disagreement as to legitimate political goals and the proper method of attainment." 132 Put more prosaically, one person's "terrorism" is another's
struggle for national liberation.
Unlike terrorism, of which it may sometimes be a component part,
torture is inherently neither political in nature nor international in scope.
A sadist may torture his victim for pleasure; a personal enemy may do so
for vengeance. Brutality alone, however, does not violate the law of nations. Torture as a violation of internationallaw has been defined as
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he has committed or
is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him or other
persons. 133
130.
131.
132.
133.

B. JENKINS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A NEW MODE OF CONFLICT 2 (1975).
Note, supra note 17, at 236 n.5.
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 796 (Edwards, J.).
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, G.A.
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What raises certain tortious injury to the level of torture may be its
severity, but what makes torture a violation of the law of nations is its
political purpose. Filartigaheld that such conduct may assume international dimensions without reaching across state borders. 1 34 Pena-Irala
acted under only apparent color of law, since his acts violated the constitution and laws of his country and were "wholly unratified by that nation's government."' 135 The parameters of the concept may vary, but the
elements of political purpose and international ramifications remain
36
constant. 1
These considerations, while far from conclusive on the question of
whether terrorism constitutes a violation of the law of nations within the
meaning of the Alien Tort Claims Act, suggest that the question might
better be framed in terms of the nature of the act than the identity of the
actor. If the acts committed on the road between Haifa and Tel-Aviv
violated international norms, perhaps it is of little import that the PLO is
not a nation-state in the nineteenth-century sense. It is certainly not an
individual. It is a recognizable and recognized political entity. 137 One
important factor in Judge Bork's hesitancy to adjudicate the case-"that
the PLO bears significantly upon the foreign relations of the United
States"' 3 -- thus distinguishes it from a truly private defendant and cuts
in favor of imputing to it international responsibility for its acts.
Such an analysis might have permitted Judge Edwards to grant section 1350 jurisdiction in Tel-Oren. This is not true of Judge Bork, whose
focus is on neither the act nor the actor but on the claim for relief.
Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doe. A/1034 (1975) (reproduced in
Filartiga,630 F.2d at 882 n.11).
134. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 884.
135. Id. at 889.
136. These elements are also inherent in the Lopes test whereby a breach of the law of
nations occurs when there is "a violation by one or more individuals of those standards, rules
or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an individual and a foreign
state, and (b) used by those states for their common good and/or in dealings interse." Lopes
v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
The Filartigacourt's qualified acceptance of this formulation stresses the importance of
context in determining which apparently domestic matters may become the subject of ihternational law. Domestic human rights violations, for example, are "of mutual, and not merely
several, concern"; they affect the nations' dealings interse. On the other hand, "the mere fact
that every nation's municipal law may prohibit theft does not incorporate the Eighth Commandment 'Thou shalt not steal. . .' into the law of nations." Filartiga,630 F.2d at 888-89
(citing IT Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975)).
137. See generally Kassim, The PalestineLiberation Organization'sClaim to Status: A JuridicalAnalysisUnderInternationalLaw, 9 DEN. J.INT'L L. & PoL'Y 1 (1980). See also Judge
Bork's criticism of Judge Robb's "demure circumspection" A propos of the PLO, Tel-Oren,
726 F.2d at 822.
138. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 805.
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An Individual Cause of Action, a Private Right to Sue

Conceptualizing the cause of action has become a primary focus of
Alien Tort Statute analysis, for while a finding that terrorism has not
attained the status of an international law violation might defeat jurisdiction in a particular case, a finding that the Act fails to provide an individual with a cause of action, coupled with a failure to identify a private
right to sue in any other body of law, would effectively close the door
Filartigaappeared to open, thus denying a federal forum to alien victims
of human rights violations perpetrated beyond our borders. Fortunately,
the latter finding is by no means inevitable.
1. The Statute: 28 U.S.C. § 1350
Ironically, the Second Circuit, in its landmark decision, did not even
pose the question, but appears to have assumed that, in Judge Edwards'
words, "aliens granted substantive rights under international law may
assert them under § 1350." '1 9 In his own Tel-Oren opinion Judge Edwards contends at length, in support of this assumption, that the first
Congress, in enacting the ancestor of the current statute, intended to provide both a forum and a cause of action for rights already recognized by
the law of nations."'
2.

The Law of Nations: Customary International Law

The notion that international law itself must provide, in addition to
substantive norms, an explicit individual right to sue seems to have
originated with a Stanford law student,14 1 and was adopted in dictum by
the district court in Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.'42 While
this may be a novel requirement in the history of Alien Tort Claims Act
jurisprudence, it is not necessarily impossible to fulfill. Contrary to
Judge Edwards' sweeping assertion, it is not by any means a foregone
conclusion that "the law of nations simply does not create rights to
sue."

143

There is, as Judge Edwards himself notes,'" a growing body of
139. Id. at 780 n.5 (interpreting this "obscure phrase" from Filartiga: "[W]e believe it is
sufficient here to construe the Alien Tort Statute, not as granting new rights to aliens, but

simply as opening the federal courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized by international law," 630 F.2d at 887).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 42-58.
141. Comment, supra note 13, at 357-59.

142. Hanoch Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 549. See also Schneebaum, supra note 25, at 71.
143. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 779; accord id. at 816-19 (Bork, J.).
144. Id. at 792-94.
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scholarship and opinion reflecting the trend in this century (and particularly since World War II) away from "classical" nineteenth-century
"statism," toward a greater recognition of individual rights and responsibilities under international law. Illustrative of this view is the United
States Department of State memorandum submitted in response to the
request of the Filartigacourt.
[I]t has long been established that in certain situations, individuals
may sue to enforce their rights under international law....
The more recently evolved international law of human rights similarly endows individuals with the right to invoke international law, in
a competent forum and under appropriate circumstances ....
[I]n nations such as the United States, where international
law is part of the law of the land, an individual's fundamental human
rights 14are
in certain situations directly enforceable in domestic
5
courts.

This "modem" conception, moreover, actually represents a return
to the Founders' understanding of the law of nations that informed the
origins of the elusive section 1350.146 But Judge Edwards finds the evidence inconclusive. "[Flor each article sounding the arrival of individual
rights and duties under the law of nations," he notes, "another surveys
the terrain and concludes that there is a long distance to go." 147
Accepting arguendo the Edwards-Bork assessment of the current
transitional stage of international law vis-i-vis private plaintiffs, there are
at least two plausible alternative sources of a cause of action for a tort
committed in violation of the law of nations: federal law and the law of
the situs of the injury.
3.

Federal Law: Common and Statutory

Judge Bork rejects appellants' contention that federal common law,
by incorporating the law of nations, automatically provides a cause of
action for its violation. 148 He also rejects the Edwards-Filartigaformulation whereby a federal statute-the Alien Tort Claims Act-is the source
145. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), reprintedin 19 INT'L L. MAT'Ls 585, 602-03 (May 1980).
146. For a discussion of the changing status of individuals in international law, see Blum &
Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 64-75; Dickinson, supra notes 3 and 65; Janis, Individuals as
Subjects of InternationalLaw, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 61 (1984); Note, supra note 11; Note,
FederalJurisdictionand the Protection of InternationalHuman Rights, 9 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 199, 214-17 (1979-80); Note, The Alien Tort Statute, supra note 13.
147. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 794.
148. Id. at 810-11. Contra Note, supra note 17, at 257.
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of a private right to sue.14 9 While Judge Bork does not share the district
court's insistence on an international cause of action,15 he does share
Judge Green's apprehension about "judicial interference with foreign affairs and international relations,"15' 1 and hence her hesitancy to imply a
federal cause of action. It is perhaps this shared bias against finding jurisdiction that accounts for their failure to consider a theory under which
federal statutory and common law together might provide plaintiffs with
a cause of action.
In Textile Workers Union ofAmerica v. Lincoln Mills ofAlabama 5 2
the Supreme Court, per Justice Douglas, held that section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act,153 by granting federal jurisdiction over suits to enforce
collective bargaining agreements, also "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law . . . from the policy of our national labor
law."' 5 4 A number of commentators have noted the ease with which this
theory lends itself to section 1350 analysis. It has been suggested that the
axiomatic incorporation of the law of nations into the law of the land
envisions just such a process: 15 5 the fashioning of remedies and standards of liability by federal courts to give effect to the norms of international law. Along these lines, Professor Garvey, in his article on emigre
repression, 156 proposes the Alien Tort Claims Act as the statutory basis
for a federal common law of international tort, pointing out its superiority in this regard to the labor legislation in Lincoln Mills. The Filartiga
court, although it ultimately rested its holding on different grounds,
157
agreed that "such a reading [of the statute] is possible."
It is instructive to glance at the treatment of Lincoln Mills in the
Stanford Law Review Case Comment15 8 which alerted Judge Green (and
through her, Judge Bork) to the shortcomings of Filartiga. For while the
Comment's author criticized the Second Circuit's failure to identify in
149. 726 F.2d at 811-16.
150. Id. at 810 n.18.
151. Id. at 800 (quoting Hanoch Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 548).
152. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).

153. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1978).
154. Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 451, 456. On "fashioning" federal common law after
Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), see Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363
(1943); United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715 (1979); Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-And
of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1964).
155. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 98. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.").
156. Supra note 110, at 97-110.
157. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 887.
158. Supra note 13.
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international law some claim upon which relief could be granted, he also
suggested an alternative constitutional basis for jurisdiction. 5 9 Judge
Green and Judge Bork adopted that part of the analysis which would
preclude jurisdiction, while ignoring the alternative which would sanction it.
The Stanford commentator calls the concept underlying his alternative analysis "protective jurisdiction," and indeed, that term is often used
in connection with Lincoln Mills. The theory of protective jurisdiction,
as summarized by Professor Wright, is that
with regard to subjects where Congress has legislative power, it can
pass a statute granting federal jurisdiction and that the jurisdictional
statute is itself a "law of the United States" within Article III, even
though Congress has not enacted
any substantive rule of decision and
160
thus state law is to be applied.
But the Lincoln Mills Court was not clearly confronted with this theory.
Although Justices Harlan and Burton in concurrence found that "the
constitutionality of section 301 can be upheld as a congressional grant to
Federal District Courts of what has been called 'protective jurisdiction,' "161 the majority holding mandates the creation of federal common
law and brings the case squarely within "true federal question
jurisdiction."'

162

159. Id. at 360-62 & nn.31-32.
160. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 20 (4th ed. 1980) (citing the seminal articles of the two leading proponents of the theory of protective jurisdiction: Wechsler, Federal
Jurisdictionand the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PRons. 216, 224-25
(1948); Mishkin, The Federal "Question" Jurisdictionof the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L.
REv. 157, 184-96 (1953)). Wright concludes that "it is difficult to believe that the Court...
would accept the commentators' proposals for 'protective jurisdiction' when to do so would
have such drastic consequences on the accepted understanding of Article III as a limitation on
the federal courts." WRIGHT, supra at 111. But see Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 933 (1982), an exhaustive and illuminating study which identifies the
flaws in both the Wechsler and Mishkin "substance-based" formulations and purports to resolve the Article III problem with a "forum-based" version. An example of "pure" protective
jurisdiction is Justice Jackson's plurality opinion in National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949). A more recent grant was upheld in Ives v. W.T. Grant, 522
F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1975).
161. Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 460. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, id., explicitly
rejects the theory of protective jurisdiction. Butsee Comment, supra note 13, at 360 n.31; Case
Comment, Verlinden V.B. v. Central Bank of Nigeria: Findingthe "OriginalIngredient" in the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 10 BROOKLYN. J. INT'L L. 543, 564 n.131 (arguing that
Frankfurter's opposition might be mitigated by the "substantial federal interest" in foreign
affairs).
162. C. WRIGHT, supra note 160, at 110.
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Persuasive arguments to the contrary notwithstanding,16 3 given that
"there is as yet no definitive answer as to the validity of the 'protective
jurisdiction' theory and it remains in the realm of speculation,""' the
Douglas (Lincoln Mills majority) approach would appear to be preferable
in cases like Tel-Oren. Section 1350 could be construed to authorize the
courts to fashion a federal common law of international tort, consistent
with their "ascertainment" of the law of nations "as it has evolved and
exists among the nations of the world today."' 6 5 This substantive law
would provide an individual cause of action-a right and a remedy-to
section 1350 plaintiffs.
4. The Law of the Situs: Lex Loci Delicti Commissi
Locating the source of a private right to sue in the law of the place
where the injury occurred is premised upon a separation of the tort from
the law of nations violation, such as was suggested in Judge Edwards'
Adra formulation of section 1350.166 In Adra v. Clift 6 7 the separation is
actual and complete. Two distinct acts were alleged: the unlawful withholding of child custody (a tort) and passport misuse (a violation of international law by which the tort was accomplished). Judge Edwards
suggests that the Tel-Oren facts might be made to fit this framework by
an allegation that the common law torts comprising the terrorist attack
were accomplished by means of landing in Israel without passports. 6
The better view, however, is that the separation is merely analytical, such
as that proposed in relation to torture and terrorism. 169 Thus an ordinary tortious act can be raised, by the context in which it occurs, to the
level of a law of nations violation for section 1350 purposes.
The traditional common law doctrine of the transitory tort170 would
allow adjudication in state courts even if the injury occurred abroad, so
long as personal jurisdiction were obtainable. The rule of decision would
be selected in accordance with familiar choice-of-law analysis. 17 1 Judge
163. See, e.g., Note supra note 160, at 1014-24 (applying the author's protective jurisdiction

theory to the Alien Tort Claims Act).
164. C. WRIGHT, supra note 160, at 111.

165. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 881.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 50-58.
167. 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
168. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 788.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 130-38.
170. See Filartiga,630 F.2d at 885 (citing the lead cases: Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161
(1774); McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 241 (1843); Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S.
120 (1904)). See also Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 63-64.
171. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1954); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).

§§ 377-383 (1934);
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Kaufman suggested that pursuant to such an analysis, "the district court
[might] well decide that fairness requires it to apply Paraguayan law to
the case.""'7 2 While the Second Circuit assumed a cause of action
granted by section 1350 itself, it could alternatively have found that the
Filartigas' cause of action arose under the Paraguayan Civil Code. Similarly, the Tel-Oren plaintiffs might have sued the PLO under Israeli law.
The difficulty with this formulation is that it does not explain how
Congress can constitutionally grant federal jurisdiction between non-di17 3
verse (alien) parties in a case governed by non-federal (foreign) law.
Some commentators would invoke the concept of "protective jurisdiction" in this context, given the strong national interest in concentrating
all litigation touching on foreign relations in general, and affecting aliens
in particular, in a federal forum for protective purposes. 74
Not too long ago, however, in Verlinden B. V v. Central Bank of
Nigeria,175 the Supreme Court again demonstrated a decided disinclination to consider the merits of protective jurisdiction. 176 The core question presented by this case was whether the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act 177 exceeds the scope of Article III of the Constitution by
authorizing a foreign plaintiff to sue a foreign state in United States District Court, where state law may provide the rule of decision. A unani172. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 889 n.25. See also Comment, supra note 13, at 362-63. But see
Note, The Alien Tort Statute, supra note 13, at 881-89.
173. The Second Circuit's reasoning on this point is neither clear nor persuasive. According to Judge Kaufman, a decision to apply Paraguayan law on remand in Filartiga
would not retroactively oust the federal court of subject matter jurisdiction, even
though plaintiff's cause of action would no longer properly be "created" by a law of
the United States. Once federal jurisdiction is established by a colorable claim under
federal law at a preliminary stage of the proceeding, subsequent dismissal of that
claim (here, the claim under the general international proscription of torture) does
not deprive the court of jurisdiction previously established.
630 F.2d at 889 n.25 (citations omitted). In fact, on remand the district court, per Judge
Nickerson, concluded that it should look to international law to determine the substantive
principles to govern the case, but to Paraguayan law to determine the appropriate remedy.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 863-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). In addition, however, the
court concluded that it was "essential and proper" to grant punitive damages not recoverable
under the Paraguayan Civil Code "in order to give effect to the manifest objectives of the
international prohibition against torture." Id. at 865.
174. See, e.g., Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 97 n.188; Case Comment, supra note
161, at 563 n.130; Note, Individual Responsibilityfor Torture Under InternationalLaw, 56
TUL. L. REv. 186, 215 n.113 (1981).
175. 461 U.S. 480 (1982).
176. Id. at 491 n.17 (citing Note, supra note 160, in which the writer uses both the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act and the Alien Tort Claims Act to illustrate the application of his
forum-based theory of protective jurisdiction).
177. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).
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mous Court, per Chief Justice Burger reversed the Second Circuit,' 78
reasoning that under the Act subject matter jurisdiction depends in the
first instance on the existence of one of the specified exemptions to sovereign immunity. 7 9
At the threshold of every action in a district court against a foreign
state, therefore, the court must satisfy itself that one of the exceptions
applies-and in doing so it must apply the detailed federal law standards set forth in the Act. Accordingly, an action against a foreign
sovereign arises under federal law, for purposes of Article III
jurisdiction.' 8 0
Likewise, any action brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 requires an
initial determination that the tort alleged constitutes a violation of the
law of nations, 18 1 necessarily raising a question of substantive federal law
at the jurisdictional threshold. Thus, although foreign law may supply
both a cause of action in tort and the governing rules of decision, such a
case clearly arises under "the laws of the United States" as that phrase is
used in Article 111.182
In the face of the demonstrable existence of several possible sources
of a private right to sue under section 1350, it must be remembered that
even Judge Bork did not say that an individual cause of action might not
be theoretically cognizable; he said only that he was unwilling to infer a
cause of action not expressly granted. In reaching this position, he was
guided chiefly by separation of powers principles which he interprets as
allocating exclusively to the political branches of government all matters
touching upon foreign affairs.' 83 The inquiry into judicial self-restraint
in the area of international relations was presented to the Court under
the rubric of the non-justiciable political question.
178. 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981). The court of appeals, per Judge Kaufman, agreed with
the district court, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), that the statute permits such an action,
but held that in so doing, it exceeds the scope of Article III of the Constitution.
179. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607 (1976).
180. Verlinden B.V, 461 U.S. at 493-94. Similarly, Judge Edwards asserts that under the
Adra formulation of § 1350, an action between aliens might still arise under the laws of the
United States for Article III purposes. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 787 n. 19. See also Illinois v. City
of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1972), (holding that a federal cause of action is not deprived of Article III "arising under" status merely because the federal ingredient is common
law rather than statutory).
181. According to Judge Kaufman, the "in violation of" language in § 1350 requires "a
more searching preliminary review of the merits" than the "arising under" formulation of the
general federal question statute, § 1331, which only requires a "colorable claim." Filartiga,
630 F.2d at 887-88. But see id. at 889 n.25 where he appears to gloss over this distinction.
182. Article III "arising under" jurisdiction is broader than statutory federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Verlinden B. V, 461 U.S. at 495.
183. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 799, 801.
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C. Nonjusticiability: The Political Question Doctrine
While neither the Second Circuit in FilartigaI8 4 nor the district
court in Hanoch Tel-Oren,185 squarely addressed the political question
doctrine, all three Tel-Oren appellate judges have done so. Judge Edwards rejects outright any abstention in the name of separation of powers;186 in particular he disdains the political question doctrine.18 7 At the
other extreme, Judge Robb finds his colleagues' "lucubrations"
all quite
' 188
unnecessary, as "the political question doctrine controls."
Judge Bork shares Judge Edwards' misgivings about the current status of the political question doctrine, 189 but he also shares Robb's desire
to avoid adjudication of issues which would present problems of judicial
competence and interference with foreign relations. Thus he invokes not
the doctrines themselves, but the separation of powers principles which
inform both the act of state and the political question doctrine 1 90
1. The Act of State Doctrine
The classic expression of the act of state doctrine is found in Un1 91 "Every sovereign State is bound to respect the
derhill v. Hernandez:
independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory." 192 Traditionally, the doctrine precluded
United States courts from adjudicating, as an issue in a case before them,
the validity of a public act of another government, primarily out of respect for that other government's national sovereignty.
By the time the Court decided Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 however, it no longer believed "that this doctrine is compelled
184. The Filartigacourt expressed its deference to the executive branch by requesting that
"the Department of State submit a memorandum setting forth its position concerning the
proper interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1350 in light of the facts of this case." Letter from A.
Daniel Fusaro, Clerk, to Robert B. Owen, Legal Advisor (Oct. 29, 1979), quoted in Memorandum, supra note 145, at 585.
185. Judge Green's opinion, 517 F. Supp. at 548, 550, suggests that she shares Judge Bork's
underlying concerns; however, she failed fully to articulate the rationale.
186. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 789-91 (attacking Judge Bork's position in a section entitled
"The Duty to Exercise Jurisdiction"). See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
187. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 796-98 (attacking Robb's position). See supra text accompanying notes 72-77.
188. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 827, 823.
189. Id. at 803, 822.
190. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801-02, 804.
191. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
192. Id. at 252.
193. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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either by the inherent nature of sovereign authority. . . or by some prin'
ciple of international law." 194
Rather "its continuing vitality depends on
its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions between the
judicial and political branches of the Government on matters bearing
upon foreign affairs."' 9 5 Thus, while not textually compelled by the constitution, "[t]he act of state doctrine does . . . have 'constitutional' underpinnings"' 9 6 in a system of separate coequal powers.
At issue in Sabbatino was the uncompensated expropriation of
American-owned property in Cuba, an action whose validity the Court
declined to examine because "[t]here are few if any issues in international
law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a
state's power to expropriate the property of aliens."' 9 7 In a passage
which has become the touchstone of both act of state and political question jurisprudence, however, the Court declined as well to lay down an
inflexible and all-encompassing rule:
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or
consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more
appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since
the courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle to
circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a
principle not inconsistent with the national interest or with international justice.' 9 8
Beginning with Justice White's scathing dissent in Sabbatino,99
there have been repeated efforts, both judicial and legislative, to articulate clearly the contours of an "international law exception" to the act of
state doctrine.20 0 Such an exception would be justifiable under either the
international or the constitutional rationale. From the standpoint of
194. Id. at 421.
195. Id. at 427-28.
196. Id. at 423.
197. Id. at 428,paraphrasedin Filartiga,630 F.2d at 881 ("[T]here are few, if any, issues in
international law today on which opinion seems to be so united as the limitations on a state's
power to torture persons held in its custody."). For a discussion of international consensus on
terrorism, see supra text accompanying notes 70, 125-38.
198. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
199. Id. at 439.
200. See, e.g., the so-called Hickenlooper amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1964, § 301(d), 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976); see also International Rule of Law Act, S.1434,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 13,959 (1981) (introduced by Senators Mathias and
Domenici) [hereinafter cited as International Rule of Law Act].
The debate has been marked by the blurring of several related issues. One is whether acts
that violate agreed upon international norms should be excepted from the respect usually accorded by United States courts through the act of state doctrine. Another is whether under- or
uncompensated expropriation of private property constitutes such a violation. Just after the

1985]

International Human Rights

comity, it is arguable that, while legitimate political diversity of values
must be respected, "[i]n instances of illegitimate diversity, where a genuine universal sentiment exists, then the domestic courts properly act as
agents of international order only if they give maximum effect to such
universality."' ' From the separation of powers perspective, on the other
hand, according to the State Department, when international consensus
exists, "there is little danger that judicial enforcement will impair our
foreign policy efforts. To the contrary, a refusal to recognize a private
cause of action in these circumstances might seriously damage the credi-

bility of our nation's commitment to the protection of human rights."'

'

Both before and after Sabbatinojudicial attempts have been made to
narrow the scope of the act of state doctrine by carving out other exceptions.20 3 Recent trends, at least among scholars, favor abolition, 2 0 4 legislative codification, °5 limitation to its original grounding in comity
principles, 0 6 and merger with or into the political question doctrine.20 7
victory of the Cuban Revolution it was difficult for some in this country to keep the legal and
truly political aspects of the second question separate from the emotional ones.
201. R. FALK, THE ROLE OF THE DoMEsTIc COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER 72 (1964).

202. Memorandum, supra note 145, at 604. This is the most direct contradiction imaginable of Judge Bork's entire analysis- predicating denial of a private cause of action on deference to the executive-emanating as it does from that very department of government. See
also 630 F.2d at 885 n.17, 889 n.24; Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 111-12.
203. E.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (commercial exception); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972)
(plurality applied the so-called "Bernstein exception," Bernstein v. N.V. NederlandscheAmerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (deferring to an executive suggestion to adjudicate)).
204. Lengel, The Duty of FederalCourts to Apply InternationalLaw: 4 PolemicalAnalysis
of the Act of State Doctrine, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REv. 61, 99 (urging that in place of the act of state
doctrine, "the courts should adopt a principle of reasonableness that has as its focal matrix a
procedure that is acceptable to the foreign nation involved in the litigation, the forum state,
and the world community").
205. See Mathias, Restructuringthe Act of State Doctrine:A Blueprintfor Legislative Reform, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 369 (1980); International Rule of Law Act, supra note 188;

Note, Limiting the Act ofState Doctrine: A Legislative Initiative,23 VA. J. INT'L L. 103 (1982).
The 1976 codification of the venerable sovereign immunity doctrine in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1330, provides an instructive comparison. Against a background

of deference to executive "suggestion" and the lack of uniform judicial interpretation, the legislation was intended "to reduce the foreign policy implications of sovereign immunity determinations and assure litigants that such crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds, an
aim that was to be accomplished by transferring responsibility for such a decision from the
executive branch to the judiciary." Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 670
(D.D.C. 1980). The parallels between the sovereign immpnity and act of state doctrines are
too evident to belabor, and cut again, this time from a legislative perspective, against Judge
Bork's separation of powers rationale for judicial abstention.
206. See, e.g., Note, supra note 205, at 104, 133 (arguing that the act of state doctrine is
essentially a special application of traditional conflict of laws rules, grounded in principles of
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The Political Question Doctrine

Even Judges Edwards and Bork agree about the shortcomings of the
political question doctrine.20 Indeed, it has been the object of "judicial
indifference and scathing scholarly attack,"20 9 from Dickinson 1 0 to Henkin.2 11 The last Supreme Court case to rely squarely upon it was Colegrove v. Green 212 some four decades ago.
The Court undertook its most comprehensive analysis of the doctrine in Baker v. Carr213 in which it enunciated the now familiar characteristics of the nonjusticiable political question:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or
[2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or
[3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
international comity-an interpretation which easily encompasses an international law
exception).
207. See, e.g., Note, The Status of the Act of State Doctrine-Applicationto Litigation Arising From Confiscations ofAmerican Owned Property in Iran, 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 89,
125 (1980) (arguing that the Supreme Court has yet to distinguish the justiciability theory of
the act of state doctrine from that of the political question). The truth is, however, quite the
opposite. Justice Brennan, the author of Baker v. Carr,dissenting in First Nat'l City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. at 787-88, suggests that the act of state doctrine is a part of
or equivalent to the political question doctrine: "In short, Sabbatino held that the validity of a
foreign act of state in certain circumstances is a 'political question' not cognizable in our
courts."
Judge Edwards, on the other hand, finds that the existence of the act of state doctrine
(and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act) obviates the need for "yet another doctrine of
nonjusticiability." Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 797 n.30. But sovereign immunity and pre-Sabbatino
act of state concepts both serve the comity principle, albeit in somewhat different ways. The
former denies jurisdiction to United States courts, in effect exempting the foreign nation from
suit altogether, while the latter merely precludes the adjudication of certain issues by according presumptive validity to the foreign nation's specific act. Thus if judicial abstention is ever
justified on separation of powers grounds, there remains a limited function for the political
question doctrine.
208. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 803, 822 (Bork, J.); id. at 796, 798 (Edwards, J.).
209. McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REv. 241, 256
(1981).
210. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as National Law: Political Questions, 104 U. PA. L.
REv.451, 492-93 (1956) ("[I]t should be possible to take cognizance of occasional recoil from
the inexpedient in judicial administration without elevating the phenomenon to the dignity of a
doctrine.").
211. Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine? 85 YALE L.J. 597, 600 (1976) ("[A]
doctrine that finds some issues exempt from judicial review cries for strict and skeptical
scrutiny.").
212. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
213. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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[4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or
[5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or
[6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.214
Three further observations of the Court in Baker are worthy of note.
First, "[t]he nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers. "215 Second, "[m]uch confusion results
from the capacity of the 'political question' label to obscure the need for
case-by-case inquiry. 21 6 Finally, although they comprise a large class of
political question cases, "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." 2" 7
Subsequently, the author of the Baker opinion reiterated the narrowness of the doctrine's application to foreign relations matters. "Properly understood, the political-question doctrine restrains courts from
reviewing an exercise of foreign policy judgment by the coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been 'constitutional[ly] commit[ted].' ,,218 Despite this attempt at limitation, it has
been argued that "[w]here the issues before a court touch the conduct of
foreign relations in some way or another . . . it is difficult to see how
they can avoid triggering one or more of these verbal devices. '"21 Moreover, the Baker test does not "eliminate the influence of personal judicial
bias from the determination that a political question is present. 2 2 °
The validity of the latter objection is amply illustrated by comparing
the treatment by the three appellate judges of the doctrine's applicability
to the Tel-Oren facts. Analyzing the same set of historical facts and
looking at the same legal standards, Edwards and Robb reach diametrically opposed conclusions.2 21 Judge Bork admits in effect that the ambiguity which cuts against applying the doctrine in any case will also allow
214. Id. at 217.
215. Id. at 210.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 211; accord Memorandum, supra note 145, at 603 ("Like many other areas
affecting international relations, the protection of fundamental human rights is not committed
exclusively to the political branches of government.").
218. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1006 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (brackets in
original).
219. Gordon, supra note 82, at 307.
220. Id.
221. For Judge Robb's analysis, see Tel-Oren, 726 F. 2d at 822-26; see also supra text accompanying notes 108-119. By contrast, Judge Edwards found neither the implication of sepa-
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him to use it if necessary to achieve his goal in this one. 222
In Baker, the Court did not base its list of criteria on an abstract
notion of justiciability, but rather deduced it from a survey of prior decisions involving political questions.2 23 There have been numerous attempts since Baker to "categorize the categories, '224 to find a theoretical
framework for the Court's apparently inconsistent practice. Professor
Tribe, for example, has discerned, underlying the Baker classification,

three distinct justifications for selective judicial deference to the political
228

227 and the functional.
branches:2 25 the classical,22 6 the prudential,
Faced with this breathtaking absence of scholarly accord as to its
rationale,
accompanied by a corresponding judicial hesitancy to apply
229
it,
one is tempted to announce the doctrine's demise. But this would
be premature. By the prominence which they have assigned to it, Judges
Bork and Robb have assured that justiciability will be an unavoidable
issue whenever the Court embarks upon Alien Tort Claims Act construction. Thus, it is not amiss to consider whether a nonjusticiable political
question is presented by the facts in Tel-Oren.2 3 °
This case does not present problems ofjudicial competence in terms
of either access to information or availability of legal standards. There

ration of powers principles nor any applicable Baker category, Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 797, in
short "no legitimate grounds for a finding of nonjusticiability." Id. at 798 n.31.
222. Id. at 803, 822.
223. According to one critic, at least with respect to issues touching the conduct of foreign
affairs, Brennan's survey was "highly abbreviated, more than a little selective, and just possibly, mistaken." Gordon, supra note 82, at 306 n.52.
224. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (reducing Baker's six categories to three inquiries: Constitutional commitment, judicial expertise,
and prudential considerations).
225. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71 n.1 (1978).

226. See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959).

227. See, e.g., Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75
HARV. L. REv. 40 (1961). This theory has been further broken down by Professor Scharpf,
infra note 228, into its opportunistic, cognitive, and normative aspects.
228. See, e.g., Scharpf, JudicialReview and the Political Question: A FunctionalAnalysis,
75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966).

229. See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Ramirez
de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1514 & n.50 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
230. Given the doctrine's ambiguity, the "necessarily" language in which the question is
framed virtually compels an answer in the negative. But this observation, of course, begs the
analytical question. The referent for "state-sponsored" in both the third and fourth questions
presented, supra text accompanying note 120, appears to be Libya, despite the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976) (deemed applicable by both Judge
Edwards, 726 F.2d at 775 n.1, and Judge Bork, id. at 805 n.13) as the PLO is not a state.
Supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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are no apparent fact-finding problems 23 ' and, as for "judicially discoverable and manageable standards,"
[t]he parties do not invoke constitutional or statutory provisions that
resist judicial application. The Supreme Court, in The Paquete Habana, explicitly acceded to the task of applying the law of nations and
instructed lower courts on how to approach the task of discovering it.
[One] therefore can hardly conclude2 32
that courts lack the means of determining what standards to apply.
Nor does this case appear to present insurmountable problems of
judicial interference with the political branches. The separation of powers issue arises in two contexts, external and internal. The former concerns the desire for "unity at home for dealing abroad 233 or a
"singlevoiced statement of policy"; 234 it has little relevance to the facts of
this case, in which there is no dispute between nations, nor is the United
States a party to the action. The court is not being asked to review any
decision, policy, position, commitment, or act of any other governmental
branch. In short, there is no potential transgression of any exercise of
authority by a coordinate branch, "much less one committed to another
branch by the Constitution,, 23 5 for there has been no exercise of authority at all.
There is, however, even absent specific action by one of the political
branches, a more limited rationale of deference to their "responsibility
for dealing with the broader context beyond the limits of the Court's
power to shape and to control," which leads courts to "exercise restraint
in situations where its decision might frustrate or embarrass the government's conduct of foreign affairs. '2 36 In Baker's terms, it is less a matter
of "adherence to a [particular] political decision already made" than of a
more general "potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious [inconsistent] pronouncements. '2 37 This rationale, however, is unpersuasive in
the present instance, in light of section 1350's prerequisite determination
231. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798 n.31 (Edwards, J.) (distinguishing Crockett v. Reagan, 720
F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983)) (action by members of the United States Congress to enjoin provision of military aid to El Salvador).
232. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 797 (Edwards, J.) (emphasis in original). See also 630 F.2d at
880-85; supra notes 12 & 29. But see 726 F.2d at 824-25 (Robb, J.). For a detailed critique of
judicial hesitancy to follow the dictates of Habana, see Gordon, supra note 82, at 308-11.
233. Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARV. L. REv. 296, 318-19 (1925).
234. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 824-25 (Robb, 3.).
235. Id. at 797 (Edwards, J.). See also Gordon, supra note 82, at 311-12; Scharpf, supra
note 228, at 574-76; supra text accompanying note 218.
236. Scharpf, supra note 228, at 581-82.
237. See supra text accompanying note 214, nos. 5 & 6.
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of a violation of the law of nations. As with the act of state doctrine, 238
where there is international consensus about a given human rights norm,
the court need not fear that its enforcement of that norm will frustrate or
embarrass Congress or the President.2 39
What might be termed the "internal" separation of powers issue
does not arise in this case either. That is, "[w]e have here no clash between two branches of government that requires us to resolve the apportionment of power between them,''24 such as was present, for example,
2 4 1 In that case, a conflict between
in Goldwater v. Carter.
members of
Congress and the President over his Taiwan treaty termination was
found by four justices to be a nonjusticiable political question. Justice
Powell, concurring, would have dismissed the suit as not ripe for review
"until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse. ' 242 Justice
Brennan, still clarifying Baker v. Carr,2 4 3 explained that before reaching
the "constitutional commitment" criterion, 2 " the question of which department of the government, if any, a given issue has been constitutionally committed to "must be resolved as a matter of constitutional law,
not political discretion; accordingly, it falls within the competence of the
245

courts.1

The divergence of interpretations of the political question doctrine
reflected in Goldwater v. Carter indicates that it is no longer true that
"[t]he political question . . . has . . . no place when the Court [is]
presented with conflicting claims of competence among the departments
of the federal government. . . . Such issues [are] decided on their merits even in the field of the foreign affairs power .. "246
Two recent court of appeals cases, Crockett v. Reagan247 and
Sanchez-Espinoza
v. Reagan,"
both dismissedofonpower
political
question
grounds. 249 Both raised
the issuewere
of apportionment
between
the

238. See supra text accompanying notes 199-202.

239. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 430 n.34; Blum & Steinhardt,
supra note 13, at 111-12; supra text accompanying note 145.

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 797 (Edwards, J.).
444 U.S. 996 (1979). See generally Gordon, supra note 82, at 313-16.
Goldwater,444 U.S. at 997.
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
See supra text accompanying n.214, no. 1.
Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1007.

246. Scharpf, supra note 228, at 585.

247. 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See supra note 231.
248. 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (attempting to halt American military activity in
Nicaragua).
249. The Sanchez-Espinoza court said, "Without necessarily disapproving the District
Court's conclusion that all aspects of the present case present a nonjusticiable political ques-
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Legislature and the Executive in the context of a congressional challenge
to the administration's Central America policy. Both involved inquiries
into a military situation which arguably went beyond the fact-finding
powers of the court.2 5 0 In support of the district court's holding in
Sanchez-Espinoza, it has been suggested that Baker be supplemented by a
rule that "[i]f the claim is concerned with establishing the boundaries of
the constitutional system of separated powers, or with fine-tuning the
system of checks and balances, then courts 2should
avoid adjudication
51
intervene.
to
reason
compelling
some
absent
Given the split on the Goldwater Court, it is difficult to say whether
this approach will prevail in the area of interbranch power struggles. Because both Crockett and Sanchez-Espinoza were brought to compel Presidential adherence to the provisions of the War Powers Resolution, 5 2 a
court might well find a compelling reason to intervene in light of the
current concern both public and congressional, with executive overreaching in the area of foreign relations, and especially in the power to make
war. As Professor Gordon has written,
at a point in history when executive decisions are coming to have no
less an impact on private lives than public legislation and judicial pronouncements traditionally do, the checks on governmental excess
which usually flow from the principle of the separation
of powers are
253
being seriously eroded in the name of that principle.
"[A]nother cog in the wheel of controversy currently surrounding
U.S. government involvement in Central America ' 2 54 is Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger,"' inwhich the plaintiff alleged that the United States
government had improperly seized his property in Honduras and used it
to establish a training base for Salvadoran soldiers. Despite the contextual similarity to both Crockett and Sanchez-Espinoza, the court held it
tion, we choose not to resort to that doctrine for most of the claims .... [We prefer to rest
our affirmance of the District Court's judgment in most respects on different grounds." 770
F.2d at 206. As to the claim of 12 members of the United States House of Representatives
under art. I, § 8,cl.11 of the Constitution, however, the court held that "the war powers issue
presented a nonjusticiable political question." Id. at 210, citing Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d
1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
250. Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d at 1356. See also Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F.
Supp. 596, 597 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding that there were no judicially discoverable and manageable standards by which to determine the underlying facts).
251. Recent Developments, ConstitutionalLaw: Political Question Doctrine and Conduct
of Foreign Policy, 25 HARv. INT'L L.J. 433, 439-40 (1984).
252. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
253. Gordon, supra note 82, at 298.
254. Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 599.
255. 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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was error to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the dispute
presented a nonjusticiable political question.
The three Central America cases can be reconciled by adding a corollary to the Baker supplement suggested above.2 56 Even if it is concerned with the separation of powers or checks and balances, "[i]f the
claim seeks the vindication of some individual right guaranteed by the
Constitution, then a compelling reason for intervention presumptively
, 257
exists."
This principle is in complete accord with Professor Scharpf's finding that "even in the field of foreign affairs, where the functional grounds
for abstention are strongest . . . the Court is limiting the thrust of the
functional rationales for the political question by a normative qualification: where important individual rights are at stake, the doctrine will not
be applied." 25' 8 This is because "the Court finds the determination of
such issues so central to its functions that it is willing to pay a very high
price in order to avoid a general delegation of this task to the political
. . . authorities."2'5 9 The centrality of the court's function as guardian of
individual rights is a constant from Marbury2 6 ° to Filartiga,2 6' whether
the norms are found in the Bill of Rights or in "the general assent of
civilized nations."26 2 At this center stand the Tel-Oren plaintiffs. The
political question doctrine-pace Judge Robb- does not control.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In 1980, the Second Circuit, resurrecting a little used jurisdictional
provision enacted by the first Congress, opened federal district courts to
victims of tortious injuries so heinous that they are universally condemned, and of such political import that they have become the subject
256. See supra text accompanying note 251.
257. Recent Development, supra note 251, at 440.

258. Scharpf, supra note 228, at 584; accord Gordon, supra note 82, at 298 n.7; see also
Ramirez de Arellano, 745 F.2d at 1515 ("The Executive's power to conduct foreign relations
free from the unwarranted supervision of the Judiciary cannot give the Executive carte blanche
to trample the most fundamental liberty and property rights of [individuals]. The Executive's
foreign relations prerogatives are subject to constitutional limitation.
...). Even Judge
Green seems to be in accord when she refers to foreign affairs and international relations as

"traditionally an area where courts have chosen to stay their hands absent some fundamental
constitutionalviolation." 517 F. Supp. at 548 (emphasis added).

259. Scharpf, supra note 228, at 584 (emphasis added).
260. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("The province of the court
is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals .... ").
261. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878, 890 (reasoning that importance of human rights outweighed dangers of judicial activism).
262. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900).
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of customary international law. While the symbolic significance of this
"small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free
all people from brutal violence"' 63 cannot be gainsaid, neither-to mix
metaphors-have the floodgates been opened.
The rarity with which the Alien Tort Claims Act can successfully be
invoked to vindicate violations of international human rights norms is
assured by a number of procedural and substantive obstacles. The plaintiff may not be a United States citizen, nor the defendant beyond reach of
the court's process. The injury alleged must be both a tort and a violation of the law of nations. The latter is a hurdle of significant proportions involving proof of a high level of consensus among the nations of
the world as well as a political context such that their concern be truly
international and not merely multinational. If the defendant is a foreign
government and the injuries sustained abroad, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act2 may preclude jurisdiction. If the defendant is the agent
of a foreign government, acting in an official capacity or otherwise
"under color of law," the act of state doctrine may preclude adjudication
of the validity of the particular act in question, unless an exception is
made for violations of international law.26 If the defendant is a nonstate actor, individual or organized group, he may not be considered liable for breaches of international standards.26 6 There is also the strong
possibility in any section 1350 case of dismissal on the grounds of forum
non conveniens if a more convenient forum is "available and prepared to
do justice."26' 7 Finally, there is the obvious difficulty of enforcing judgments on alien defendants without property in this country.
The United States is therefore in little danger of being perceived, by
dint of an occasional Filartiga,as "an officious interloper and an international busybody."2' 68 Rather, this creative and humane recycling of our
legal heritage signifies to the rest of the world this nation's commitment
to the preservation of fundamental human rights, and to the world's
malefactors that they may not take refuge here.2 69 It also allows the
263. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 890.
264. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605(a)(5) (1976). See generally Blum & Steinhardt, supra note
13, at 104-07.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 191-207.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 63-70.
267. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). See generallyBlum &
Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 103-04; Comment, supra note 13, at 367-68 and cases cited at
n.66.
268. 726 F.2d at 821 (Bork, J.). In this regard, see also Note, Limiting the Scope of Federal
Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 941 (1984).
269. Former associates of "Baby Doc", for example, or of Ferdinand Marcos, in weighing
the advantages of political asylum in the United States, must also consider the likelihood that
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courts of the United States to participate in the continuing development
of international law.
Perhaps, in refusing to review the case of Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, the Supreme Court recognized that the importance of the issues at stake was incommensurate with the merits of the underlying
claim. From the outset the complaint suffered several defects,270 at least
two of which appear incurable: the running of the applicable statute of
limitations2 7 ' and the failure to effectuate service of process on the
PLO.2 72 A dismissal on either of these procedural grounds would have
been limited to the facts of Tel-Oren.
Disposition of the case on the substantive issue of terrorism as a
violation of the law of nations would have had broader impact. Regardless of the outcome, the consensus inquiry would have resulted in the
kind of "refinement and elaboration" of the scope of fundamental rights
27 3
conferred by international law envisaged by the court in Filartiga.
Even a negative finding as to terrorism, although dispositive of the case
at bar, would not have foreclosed subsequent section 1350 human rights
litigation, based on other delicts.
On the other hand, a finding that any suit requiring such an inquiry
necessarily presents a nonjusticiable political question would severely
limit section 1350 jurisdiction. Moreover, the limitation is unnecessary.
The Filartigacourt has painstakingly updated the methodology for determining which acts are and which are not violations of international law.
"That the task might be difficult, [should] in no way lead to the conclusion that it should not be accomplished."27' 4 To say that consensus may
be lacking is not to say that judicially discoverable and manageable standards for the appropriate inquiry are lacking. If the determination of
consensus, which is central to establishing jurisdiction, always implicates
a political question, the result is to freeze Alien Tort Statute jurisprudence in the Filartigamold, in precise opposition to the hopes and expections of the Filartigacourt.
An even more devastating result would follow from a finding that
the Act itself fails to provide an individual cause of action and a requiresome of those who fled their regimes preceded them to our shores and might haul them into
federal court to answer for atrocities committed "under color of law."
270. For a complete list, see Schneebaum, supra note 25, at 72.
271. D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-301(4) (1981). This was a secondary basis for dismissal and
was raised on appeal along with the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Hanoch Tel-Oren, 517
F. Supp. at 550-51; Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775.
272. Hanoch Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 545 n.1.
273. Filartiga.630 F.2d at 885.
274. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 797 (Edwards, J.).
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ment that plaintiffs identify elsewhere an explicit grant thereof. It is
clear that a private right to sue may be inferred from the statute itself, or
recognized in a number of other sources-domestic, foreign, or international. The choice not to imply a cause of action from any body of law is
a choice with "no basis in the language of the statute, its legislative history or relevant precedent. '275 It is a crabbed interpretation which will
put an end to all section 1350 litigation not involving pirates. It is an
unjustifiable abdication ofjudicial responsibility which will slam shut the
door opened by Filartiga.

275. Id. at 779 (Edwards, J.).

